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Among the many forces2 which contributed to the political liberalization of  African nations, civil society 
formations played a pivotal role in dismantling authoritarian one-party rule and opening public space for 
wider political participation.3 However, democratic gains achieved during the 1990s have slowly begun to 
erode as conflict has resurfaced across the continent and many hybrid4 democratic regimes have adopted 
repressive tactics to maintain political power. The increasing regulation of  the civil society sector indicates 
a  return to autocratic  practices  and a backlash against  democratization.  Yet,  despite  this  trend several  
countries have also adopted enabling frameworks for civil  society, recognizing the contribution of  this  
sector to national development. The existence of  these simultaneous trends invites a re-examination of  the 
current state of  African civil society and its relationship to democratic consolidation. 
The  first  section  of  this  paper  provides  a  brief  overview  of  the  recent  history  of  state-civil  society  
relations  in  Africa.  The  second  section  examines  the  current  trend  in  repressive  NGO legislation  in  
Zambia, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe, which include: (1) barriers to entry; (2) barriers to operational activity 
and free speech; and (3) barriers to resources.5 The third and final section frames this trend within the 
history of  democratization in Africa and identifies new directions for research and analysis. 6  
The 1990s ushered in an era of  hope and optimism in Africa, as previously autocratic regimes took salutary  
steps towards accommodating political participation, establishing democratic institutions, and relinquishing 
absolute power over state apparatus. The failure of  state-socialism and the victory of  liberal democracy  
created new incentive structures for developing nations to adopt political and economic reforms to ensure  
favorable aid flows. African civil society played a pivotal role in this transition as well, convening sovereign  
national conferences and constituent assemblies which laid the foundations for multi-party democracy and 
political transition.  
2 Other forces include the collapse of the Cold War bipolar system, international pressures for democratization, the  
contagion effect of popular democratic movements in Eastern Europe and various forms of aid conditionality. 
3 Gyimah-Boadi, E. "Civil Society in Africa." Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 118-32.  
4 Hybrid regimes refer to the ‘incomplete’ or ‘stalled’ transitions to multi-party democracy which emerged as a result of 
political liberalization in the early 1990s.
5 This analysis adopts the framework established in the World Movement for Democracy’s February 2008 report,  
“Defending Civil Society.” www.wmd.org
6 It should be noted that the countries covered by this paper represent examples of repressive regimes. There are also  
examples of African states which have created enabling environments for civil society such as Ghana, Senegal, and  
Tanzania, to name a few.  A comparative study of the legislative and political environment for civil society in a mix of 
repressive and open regimes will be the subject my dissertation research.
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This third wave of  democratization resulted from a combination of  internal and external pressures to open  
up closed political spaces and create the conditions for democratic governance and popular participation. 
The question of  why nations transition from autocratic to democratic systems is posed by Robert Dahl in  
terms of  the “the costs of  suppression” versus the “costs of  toleration.” 7 When the former outweigh the 
latter,  even  dictatorial  regimes  will  cede  to  nominal  levels  of  political  inclusion  and  compromise  to  
maintain access to political power. During the third wave of  democratization, the costs of  suppression 
greatly increased. Post Cold War, international allies withdrew their support from autocratic leaders who 
had previously enjoyed unlimited amnesties and financial backing from opposing sides in the East-West 
divide. 
The victory of  economic and political liberalism gave rise to a global consensus regarding the virtues of  
democracy.  Democratic  government  promised  to  advance  economic  development,  human  rights,  and 
peace. The practical implications of  this new consensus were manifest in the proliferation of  democracy-
assistance programs funded by governments, multilateral bodies, international financial institutions,  and 
independent  foundations.8 The  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  failure  of  state-centered  development 
strategies led international donors to seek new avenues to influence political and economic development, 
namely  civil  society  and non-governmental  organizations.  Civil  society’s  role  thus  expanded from the  
sphere of  political and civil liberties to play an integral role in development strategies, poverty reduction,  
humanitarian aid, and basic services provision. 
Incomplete  democratic  transitions  have  created  a  new  kind  of  authoritarianism  in  which  outright 
repression and violence are no longer tolerable  given the increased effectiveness of  civil  society  from 
within the state and the international climate for human rights and donor conditionality based on good  
governance and the rule  of  law.  In  these  cases,  autocrats  have either  appointed and quickly  replaced 
reformists after brief  intervals of  unsuccessful democratization, or have held on to power while touting 
superficial  liberalization  and  a  moderately  more  open  political  space  for  democratic  opposition.  The 
underlying  political  realities  remain  unchanged:  manipulated  elections,  weak  government  institutions,  
excessively powerful executives, state-censured media, rampant corruption, and the lack of  an independent 
7 Dahl, Robert Alan. Polyarchy :Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. As quoted by 
Linda Kirschke (2000).
8  Gershman, Carl and Allen, Michael. "New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on Democracy Assitance." Journal
of Democracy 17.2 (2006): p. 36.
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judiciary.9 
Since democratic movements have the potential to topple weak states in favor of  democracy and away 
from the control of  ruling elites, civil society represents a viable threat to the stability of  these repressive  
regimes.10 Such  politically  insecure  governments  have  adopted  subtle  strategies  for  quelling  dissent,  
including: barriers to entry, legal restrictions on NGO activities, and barriers to resources. 
1.  Barriers to Entry (Registration Limitations)
In most cases, the right to association is guaranteed by national constitutions. In Ethiopia, the right to free 
association is enshrined in Article 31 of  the Constitution stating that ‘Everyone shall have the right to form  
associations for whatever purpose.’ The Zambian constitution safeguards fundamental rights and freedoms 
including the  right  to  freedom of  association  under  Article  11  (b).  The  same is  true  for  Zimbabwe.  
However,  these rights  are obstructed by prohibitions against unregistered groups,  complex registration 
procedures,  vague  grounds  for  denial,  re-registration  requirements,  and  barriers  for  international  
organizations. For example, the 2008 Ethiopian Proclamation on Societies and Charities imposes severe 
penalties on individuals managing unregistered groups including a fine of  10,000 Birr (approximately $800  
US) which can be combined with a prison sentence of  up to 5 years.11 Such penalties undermine the civil 
society sector by criminalizing unregistered groups and creating a climate of  fear and insecurity for groups  
which have not yet received legal status. 
To ensure the independence and freedom of  civil society organizations, registration procedures should be 
voluntary, efficient, time-bound, and include well defined grounds for refusal of  registration. 12 Contrary to 
these international  best  practices,  repressive legislations create mandatory and burdensome registration 
requirements  which  are  purposefully  vague.  The  2009  Zambian  NGO  Bill  mandates  compulsory 
registration for all NGOs, a requirement that can be debilitating for community based organizations, which  
may or  may not  be  able  to produce official  documents such as annual  reports  and audited accounts.  
Although the bill  allows for  organizations  to  begin  activities  once  a  registration  application  has  been  
9  Gershman (2006: 36).
10  Gershman, Carl and Allen, Michael. "New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on Democracy Assistance." Journal
of Democracy 17.2 (2006): 38. 
11 Bhekinikosi Moyo, Regulating Civil Society in Africa, Unpublished article, p. 11.
12 Mandeep S. Tiwana, “Analysis of the Zambia NGO Bill 2009,” Civil Society Watch Program, CIVICUS.
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entered, it does not prescribe time limits on application processing. This uncertainty effectively prevents  
organizations from making intermediate and long term plans since future registration status remains in  
doubt.13 Similarly, in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, regulations governing the registration process are 
vague  and  leave  considerable  discretion  to  the  registration  officials.  As  a  result,  NGOs have  trouble  
registering, bear long delays, recurring requests for information, and in some cases denial. 
In  all  four  countries,  the  grounds  for  refusing  registration  are  poorly  defined  thereby  creating  the 
conditions  for  prejudicial  decisions  against  which  civil  society  organizations  have  no  legal  recourse. 
Registration can be denied for a number of  reasons, all of  which repose on the discretionary power of  
political authorities. In Zambia, an application for registration can be rejected on the basis of  failing to  
contribute to “public interest,” which is not defined in the text of  the bill, or upon recommendation of  the 
NGO Council,  a  body created under  the  auspices  of  the  bill  to  oversee  registration  processes. 14 The 
absence of  clearly  defined  rules  and regulations regarding the  registration  procedures  exacerbates  the 
climate of  insecurity for NGOs whose registration status remains at the discretion of  political authorities.  
Additionally, the Zambian NGO Bill requires registration applicants to specify the administrative districts,  
divisions,  and location where NGOs plan to carryout proposed activities as well  as indicate proposed 
sources of  funding. These stipulations represent self-imposed constraints which could seriously hamper 
the future expansion and effectiveness of  civil society organizations. 
2.  Barriers to Operational Activity (Legal Restrictions on NGO Activities)
Once organizations have successfully negotiated complex and burdensome registration requirements, legal  
constraints can restrict  the types of  activities they participate in.  These barriers to operational  activity  
include direct prohibition of  certain spheres of  activity, intrusive government oversight, criminal sanctions 
against individuals, and the threat of  termination or dissolution.  Recent legislation in all three countries  
includes provisions which correspond to one or more of  these barriers to operational activity. 
Both the 2004 Zimbabwean NGO Bill and the 2008 Ethiopian Proclamation on Societies and Charities  
impose restrictive definitions of  foreign versus national NGOs, which are subsequently used to prohibit  
certain spheres of  activity. In Zimbabwe, the 2004 bill defined local NGOs as those organizations that are  
13Tiwana, Ibid, p. 3.
14 Mandeep S. Tiwana, “Analysis of the Zambia NGO Bill 2009,” Civil Society Watch Program, CIVICUS, p. 4.
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founded, managed, and staffed by Zimbabwean nationals residing in the country. Foreign NGOs whose 
primary purpose involves governance issues would be denied registration, and local NGOs participating in 
governance activities would be prohibited from receiving foreign funding. Similarly, charities and societies  
established by Ethiopians under Ethiopian law would be deemed foreign institutions if  they received more 
than 10% of  their  funding from foreign sources.  Foreign NGOs are prohibited from participating in  
activities  that  advance  citizenship,  community  development,  human  and  democratic  rights,  conflict  
resolution, equality, diversity,  and the efficiency of  the justice and law enforcement system. These laws 
effectively  relegate  civil  society  organizations  to  service  delivery  and  preclude  their  engagement  with  
substantive issues such as human rights and governance. 
The  establishment  of  government  oversight  agencies  to  regulate  the  NGO  sector  creates  intrusive 
supervisory mechanisms which are in many cases beyond judicial review. Invasive oversight measures may 
take the form of  burdensome reporting requirements, interference in internal management, and mandatory 
coordination with government policy. Much like the Zambian bill, the Ethiopian proclamation establishes a 
regulatory agency with virtually limitless powers including the authority to revoke registration status and 
dissolve organizations which it suspects of  “misconduct or mismanagement” or participating in “unlawful 
purposes”  which  are  “contrary  to  national  or  public  interest.”  In  addition,  the  Ethiopian  agency  can  
appoint, remove, or suspend staff  of  civil society offices, freeze assets, perform intrusive audits, intervene 
in internal decision making processes, scrutinize operations, and force testimonial disclosure with respect  
to any matter related to the organizations operations. Membership lists and donor records are also required  
in order to provide government access to information regarding all individuals potentially associated with 
an organization.15 Under these circumstances, participating in local civil society organizations entails serious  
personal risk since NGO members can be fined and imprisoned as a result of  their connection to any  
“unlawful” organization.16  
3.  Barriers to Resources
NGO legislation can be used to constrain the ability of  NGOs to secure the funding necessary to carry out 
their activities. Increasingly, barriers to funding have become common place and target foreign funding in  
15 Alemayehu G. Mariam, “No Good Deed will go Unpunished,” February 25, 2008. EthioPolitics.com 
(http://ethiopolitics.com/news_1/20080225280.html)
16 Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation, No. 621/2009, Article 10.103 (February 2009). 
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particular.  Zimbabwe was the first African country to institute legislation restricting foreign funding to 
local organizations and proscribing the types of  work local organizations could participate in once they had  
received foreign backing.  Similarly, the 2009 Ethiopian law restricts NGOs receiving more than 10% of 
their financing from foreign sources to engage in activities related to “the advancement of  human and 
democratic  rights.”17 This  severely  limits  the productivity of  these  organizations because  it  is  virtually 
impossible  for  these  groups  to raise  sufficient  funds  from local  sources.  Such provisions silence civil  
society by starving NGOs of  resources, essentially extinguishing their right to expression.18  
Implications for Democratic Consolidation in Africa 
Although the progress of  democracy in Africa since the 1990s is undeniable, many of  Africa’s democratic  
transitions remain incomplete and pluralistic policies exist alongside persistent authoritarian practices. In  
this regard, Larry Diamond distinguishes between electoral democracy and liberal democracy.19 Electoral 
democracy refers to a minimalist conception of  democratic practice based on electoral competition and  
participation, while liberal democracy refers to the qualitative elements of  political freedom necessary to 
render electoral participation meaningful. These political freedoms, which include the right to free speech, 
the right to media independence, and the right to free association, are currently being undermined by the  
drafting,  restrictive  NGO  legislation  across  the  continent.  Until  these  fundamental  rights  have  been 
operationalized, African democracies will remain hostage to political elites in control of  state apparatus. 
Democratic consolidation in Africa thus requires a vibrant and free civil society which can contribute to 
the  transformation  of  electoral  democracies  into  liberal  democracies  through  the  expansion  political 
freedoms and mobilization of  popular  participation in economic and political  development.  The state 
remains an essential player in this important work, thus the two sectors must develop effective rules of  
engagement so that they can work as allies rather than as adversaries. The repressive legislations discussed  
in this  paper  fail  to provide a  positive regulatory  framework which could advance local  civil  society’s  
capacity to contribute to economic and political development by providing predictable and reliable systems  
of  corporate governance, oversight, and management. Instead, these legislations represent an underhanded 
attempt by the state to re-conquer the political arena and criminalize dissent. These authoritarian efforts are 
17 Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation, No. 621/2009, Article 14 (2) (j-n) (February 2009).
18 “Barred from the Debate: Restrictions on NGO Public Policy Activities”, Global Trends in NGO Law, Volume 1, Issue 3,  
p. 6. Source: http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/globaltrends/GloTrends1-3.htm 
19 Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7.3 (1996): 21.
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in contrast to the enabling environments nurtured by several African governments, which recognize civil  
society  and the  NGO sector  as  partners  in  economic  and political  development.  In  these  cases,  the 
regulation of  civil society becomes a welcome sign of  state strength and contributes to advance political  
legitimacy and popular support for good governance. 
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